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1. INTRODUCTION 
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Theory of Mind (ToM) is the cognitive ability to impute mental states to the self and to 
others (Premack & Woodruff, 1978), to predict and to explain behaviours in terms of 
mental states. It underlies the ability to comprehend and predict the behaviour of other 
people and to interpret the actions of others as meaningful and intentional (Rowe & 
Morris, 2001). It allows one to attribute mental states to others, to understand that other 
people may hold and act upon beliefs different from one’s own. Theory of mind 
includes the nature and development of our understanding of the inner mental world 
inhabited by beliefs, desires, attitudes, emotions, thoughts, perceptions, intentions, and 
other mental states. This appreciation of alternate perspectives is crucial for successful 
social interaction, communication, adaptation and functioning.  
 
Research on theory of mind has proven to be of interest, not only to psychiatrists but 
also to researchers and practitioners in fields such as philosophy, developmental 
psychology, neuro psychology, social psychology, clinical psychology, cultural 
psychology, cognitive psychology, and education. Many authors have documented 
Theory of Mind deficits in pervasive developmental disorders, deaf mute children, 
schizophrenia, acute psychosis, mood disorders and in intellectual disabilities. Theory 
of Mind deficits has been postulated to be etiologically associated with autism spectrum 
disorders and with schizotypy, which renders high vulnerability to major psychotic 
disorders. 
 
There is ongoing debate in cognitive psychology between two conflicting theoretical 
viewpoints, which consider Theory of Mind as a specific cognitive domain and as a 
part or product of general cognitive abilities. In spite of selective theory of mind 
impairment with spared executive function skills in pervasive developmental disorders, 
specific cortical localization of theory of mind ability with the help of functional neuro 
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imaging, and neurological lesion studies supporting the presence of Theory of Mind as 
independent specific cognitive domain, this controversy still lingers due to the 
existence of conflicting clinical, neuropsychological and research evidence (Fine & 
Blair, 2001; Zelazo, 2002). Hence, it is indispensable to study the relationship between 
Theory of Mind and general cognitive abilities such as intelligence, before plunging in 
to further depths of its deficit related research.  
 
Intelligence is broadly defined as an overall ability for learning and problem solving. 
There are various standardized test batteries available to quantify Intelligence Quotient 
(IQ). Children with normal or high IQ may have low theory of mind ability and vice 
versa. Intelligence is considered to be the prime confounding factor in any assessment 
of Theory of Mind. However, the direct relationship between IQ and Theory of mind 
functioning has been less studied systematically (Brune, 2003; Muris, et al, 1998; 
Yirmiya, et al, 1996; Happe, 1994). Understanding the relationship between theory of 
mind ability and intelligence quotient is also essential for better planning of care for 
children with intellectual disabilities. Hence, clarifying the role of IQ is the need of the 
hour to guide future research and clinical practice.  
 
We therefore perceive that an important area of research in cognitive psychology, 
involves establishing the relationship between Theory of Mind ability and IQ. Previous 
studies have investigated the relationship of theory of mind with executive functions 
and language development, mostly in children with psychopathology (Joseph & Tager- 
Flusberg, 2004). Hence, a sensible place to begin seems to be to study a population that 
is not confounded with psychopathology or sensory deficits. A Meta analysis of theory 
of mind studies in children with intellectual disability asserts that such children have 
prominent theory of mind deficits which differ depending on various aetiologies of 
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intellectual disability (Yirmiya, et al., 1998; Cornish, et al, 2005). Studies investigating 
theory of mind functioning in normal school children who possess average to high 
range of IQ are sparse. Hence, this inquiry is required to establish the relationship 
between Theory of Mind and IQ, in children over broad IQ ranges, who are devoid of 
any psychiatric morbidity. 
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2.1. HISTORY OF ToM 
The view of the human mind as an intentional agent that contains mental states such as 
beliefs and desires was present even in ancient Vedic texts. Psychological theorists 
such as Descartes and Freud have postulated the genesis and development of one’s own 
mental world and it’s distinction from the mental world of others. However, the 
conceptualization of this mentalizing ability as a specific skill, distinct from other 
cognitive functions, and the term “theory of mind”, have emerged relatively recently 
from the fields of philosophy and developmental psychology. The concept of ToM 
evolved over the last century, in three major phases (Flavell, 2004). First phase started 
with Piagetian model of cognitive development. A second phase was the extensive 
work on Meta cognitive development and the explosion of experimental endeavours to 
examine existing hypotheses marked the third phase. 
 
2.1.1. First phase 
As is true of many areas of cognitive development, the history of Theory of Mind 
mainly begins with Jean Piaget (Flavell, 2000; Flavell & Miller, 1998; Shantz, 1983). 
Piaget studied the development of perspective taking. A central Piagetian claim was 
that children begin development by being cognitively egocentric. Piaget and his 
colleagues used egocentrism and other concepts to interpret their developmental studies 
of a wide variety of social-cognitive topics: perceptual perspective taking; egocentric 
communication; the misattribution of mental characteristics to physical objects, that is 
animism and physical characteristics to mental events that is realism; and 
understanding of thoughts, dreams, intentions, and morality. Research on some of these 
topics still continues, although usually not from a Piagetian theoretical perspective 
(Woolley & Boerger, 2002). 
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2.1.2. Second phase 
A second wave of theory and research in this area was the extensive work on Meta 
cognitive development that began in the early 1970s. Meta cognition has been defined 
as any knowledge or cognitive activity that takes as its object, or regulates, any aspect 
of any cognitive activity (Flavell & Miller, 2002). Many studies have investigated 
children's Meta memory, that is, their knowledge about variables affecting memory 
performance and, especially, their knowledge and use of memory strategies. Research 
in the Meta cognitive development has been performed on cognition concerning 
comprehension, communication, language, perception, attention, and problem solving.  
Prior to 1983, most investigators of children's knowledge about the mind would 
probably classify their work as either Meta cognitive or in the general Piagetian 
tradition. The impetus for the term “Theory of Mind” was in 1978, when a seminal 
paper, “Does the chimpanzee have a ‘theory of mind’?” was published (Premack& 
Woodruff, 1978). They reported the possibility that chimpanzees are implicitly aware 
that different individuals can have different thoughts and use this ability to predict their 
behaviour. Wellman and his co-workers had also independently conceptualized 
children's developing Meta cognitive knowledge and understanding of mental terms as 
the development of a Theory of Mind (Wellman, 1985). Then on, the term ‘Theory of 
Mind” is in vogue in the developmental and cognitive psychology literature. 
 
2.1.3. Third phase 
Third phase was characterised by explosion of research, which modified theoretical 
concepts in to experimental hypotheses and then into objective evidence. Dennet first 
proposed a stringent test for the presence of theory of mind, the prediction of another 
person’s behaviour on the basis of that person’s false belief (Dennet, 1978). This 
concept was refined to an experimental paradigm by two Austrian psychologists, Heinz 
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Wimmer and Josef Ferner in 1983. In a highly influential series of studies, they used 
the "unexpected transfer" method to test young children's understanding of false belief 
(Wimmer & Ferner, 1983). This led to an alliance of Meta cognitive researchers with 
other researchers who were working with related cognitive modalities such as children's 
knowledge about perception and about the appearance-reality distinction. This alliance 
became the Theory of Mind movement, which secured further identity and coherence 
by two conferences that were held in the spring of 1986. The presentations given at 
these two conferences were later published in a book entitled “Developing Theories of 
Mind” (Astington & Olson, 1988), and the movement was officially launched. 
Much of the earliest work was focused on documenting a salient improvement between 
three and five years of age in children's performance on various false-belief, 
appearance-reality, and visual perspective-taking tasks. Then, research has progressed 
concurrently in a variety of directions and majority of the literature over the last 20 
years deals with such experimental ventures to study the development and deficits of 
mentalizing and central coherence in normally developing children and children with 
psychopathology and neurological impairment (Stuss & Alexander, 2001). 
 
2.2. THEORIES ABOUT ToM: 
Although the core definition of theory of mind holds fairly constant, the structure and 
processes of this mental state attribution ability have been described from radically 
different theoretical perspectives. It is important to understand the different theories of 
theory of mind, because each makes different predictions about the nature of 
mentalizing ability and supports different claims about the existence of specific neural 
structures that might sub serve theory of mind. Three major psychological theories are 
theory theory, modularity theory and simulation theory. They differ on their emphasis 
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on the roles of experience, neurological maturation and role taking in the development 
of ToM respectively. 
 
2.2.1. Theory Theory: 
The theory theory views theory of mind as a developing, evolving theory about other 
minds that is revised with experience over time. This theoretical stance posits several 
different theories of mind that replace one another as an individual’s appreciation of 
alternate, cognitive perspectives becomes increasingly more sophisticated (Gopnik & 
Wellman, 1994). Theory-theory holds that theory of mind is not an innate ability; 
however it may be based upon an innate, general theory formation mechanism, or even 
on an innate, primitive, mind oriented, starting state theory (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 2000). 
Theory theory does not view theory of mind as a specific cognitive domain, but rather 
as a specialized, cognitive skill dependent on the operation of more general inferential 
abilities, and perhaps dependent upon general theory-formation mechanisms as well. It 
does not support a specific, dedicated neural system for theory of mind. A number of 
steps in children's progression toward the adult theory of mind have been described. 
Children begin with a desire psychology, then progress to a desire belief psychology, 
and finally attain adult belief desire psychology, in which one recognizes that what 
people believe, as well as what they desire, crucially affects how they behave 
(Bartsch& Wellman, 1995). Theory theorists argue that experience plays a major 
formative role in children's theory of-mind development. 
 
2.2.2. Modular theory: 
A module is defined as an innate, encapsulated and domain specific part of cognitive 
architecture (Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). Modules can be classified as synchronic modules, 
which imply static capacity, and diachronic modules, which developmentally attain 
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their capacity from the environment, by a process termed as parameterization. Such 
parameters are essentially variables whose predetermined potential values can be set by 
experience (Segal, 1996). Theory of Mind is theorized to be a diachronic module which 
has a specific innate basis but developmentally dynamic by its interaction with 
environment. Hence, modular theorists claim that Theory of Mind exists as a distinct, 
cognitive ability that is functionally dissociable from other cognitive functions. In 
addition, they assert that the Theory of Mind module is innate, follows a pre-set 
developmental course, and matures relatively independently from other cognitive skills 
(Leslie & Roth, 1993). Modular theorists also make a clear distinction between 
inferencing about abstract mental states, which is a theory of mind skill, and 
inferencing about the physical world, which is considered to be a general inferencing 
skill, unrelated to theory of mind (Binnie & Williams, 2003). They support the 
existence of one or more neural structures specifically dedicated to theory of mind. 
Experience may be necessary to trigger the operation of these neural mechanisms, but it 
does not determine their nature. 
The dissociation between theory of mind and other high- level cognitive skills as 
evidenced in studies of autism (Baron-Cohen & Frith, 1995) provide strong evidence 
that theory of mind may indeed be a distinct, domain specific skill, as modular theorists 
claim. Further support for the domain specificity of theory of mind comes from the 
cross cultural studies which established a uniform developmental stage sequence for 
theory of mind in children across cultures (Avis & Harris, 1991; Jin & Chen, 2002), 
and from geriatric studies which indicate that theory of mind may be selectively 
preserved, and even enhanced, in the normal elderly population, relative to memory and 
other cognitive abilities (Happe & Brownell, 1998).  
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2.2.3. Simulation theory: 
Simulation theorists propose that theory of mind ability can be most accurately 
conceived of as an act of role taking (Langdon & Coltheart, 2001). From this 
perspective, individuals simulate what reality would look like to another person by 
mentally placing themselves into that person’s perspective, and then predicting what 
they themselves would do in the other person’s place. Simulation theory does not 
differentiate between abstract, cognitive perspective taking and concrete, visual 
perspective-taking that involves mental manipulation of a physical environment. This is 
in contrast with modular theory, which clearly differentiates mental state inferences 
from inferences about the concrete, physical world. In addition, simulation theory does 
not require the meta-representational computations about reality that are imposed by 
some modular theorists (Leslie & Roth, 1993). Little empirical evidence exists for this 
general perspective taking, simulation theory. This theory does not predict the existence 
of a specialized, distinct neural architecture for theory of mind ability. Like theory 
theorists, simulation theorists also assume that experience plays a crucial formative 
role, in that it is through practice in role taking that children improve their simulation 
abilities. 
 
2.3. COMPONENTS OF ToM: 
Thanks to contemporary broader definitions, Theory of Mind is no longer considered a 
simple cognitive faculty such as false belief. It exemplifies a complex cognitive 
architecture with divergent Meta representational applications. Hence, Theory of Mind 
is proposed to be made of multiple discrete components by various investigators.  
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2.3.1. Fundamental components 
Theory of Mind has explicit mental state language and implicit behavioural 
components. They involve two major fundamental components. They are ontological 
component, that is ability to distinguish between real and mental world and causal 
component that is ability to understand mutual casual relationships between mental 
states and physical behavioural world (Yirmiya, et al, 1998; Wellman, 1990). 
 
2.3.2. Neuro physiological components 
A review of functional neuro imaging studies reveal a system with three neural 
components consistently activated during both implicit and explicit mentalizing tasks. 
They are medial prefrontal cortex, temporal poles and posterior superior temporal 
sulcus. The functions of the medial prefrontal cortex can be elucidated the basis of a 
decoupling mechanism that distinguishes mental state representations from physical 
state representations; the posterior superior temporal sulcus region is probably the basis 
of the detection of agency, and the temporal poles might be involved in preference for 
social stimuli. The activation of these components in concert appears to be critical to 
theory of mind functioning (Frith& Frith, 2003). Other related neural components, 
particularly amygdala and mirror neurons are also found to play some role in the 
development of the circuitry mediating theory of mind (Fine & Blair, 2001). 
Another neuro biological model proposed for Theory of Mind presents two 
components. It is composed of a representational component sub served by posterior 
temporal and parietal lobes and an application or execution component sub served by 
prefrontal regions. Information processed in posterior regions is relayed through a 
limbic para limbic system, which is essential for the implementation of theory of mind 
processes (Abu – Akel, 2003). 
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2.3.3. Social components 
There are two distinct social components of a Theory of Mind. They are social-
cognitive component and social perceptual component. They are proposed to have 
distinct neurobiological substrates which are dissociable. They may be selectively 
impaired or spared in specific conditions such as William’s syndrome in which social 
perceptual component is spared but the social cognitive component is impaired (Tager- 
Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000). 
 
2.3.4. Developmental components 
During the development of children’s understanding of mind, diverse components 
appear in a programmed chronological order. It is proposed that the late-developing 
components of Theory of Mind rely on a different neural mechanism from the early-
developing components, and that these mechanisms remain distinct into adulthood 
(Saxe & Wexler, 2005). These components include elements dealing with visual 
perception, attention, desires, beliefs, emotions, knowledge, pretense, thinking and 
Meta thinking. Hence, the componential view of Theory of Mind slices the 
understanding of mind in to various levels of development of these elements. 
Even during the early preschool period, children realize that a person will see an object 
if and only if the person's eyes are aimed in the general direction of the object, and if 
there are no vision-blocking obstacles interposed between the person and the object 
(Flavell, 1992). They are able to do simple, non-egocentric visual perspective-taking, 
such as inferring that others may see something that they do not and vice versa. This is 
termed as Level 1 knowledge about visual perception. In the preschool period, they go 
on to recognize that the same thing may present different visual appearances to two 
people if they view it from different positions that is Level 2 knowledge of visual 
perception. 
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Even infants pay attention to other people's attending and seem to have some 
understanding of its implications (Tomasello & Haberl, 2003). In subsequent years, 
they appreciate that attention is selective and limited and that different people may 
mentally represent the same attended input differently (Fabricius & Schwanenflugel, 
1994). By the age of three, children not only use some desire terms correctly, they also 
seem to grasp simple causal relations among desires, outcomes, emotions, and actions. 
For example, they understand that people will feel good if they get what they want and 
feel bad if they do not (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). 
It has been documented that young preschoolers actually attribute inner feelings to 
people who display emotions (Wellman & Sinclair, 1995). Then, children learn more 
advanced truths about emotions, that people do not always really feel what they appear 
to feel and that people's emotional reactions to an event may be influenced by earlier 
emotional experiences with similar events or by their current mood (Flavell & Miller, 
1998). Some important elementary knowledge concerning thinking such as construing 
it as an internal human activity that represents real or imaginary things develops during 
the early preschool years (Wellman& Schult, 1996).   
Children's knowledge about mental representations continues to increase after the 
preschool period. It is not until middle childhood that children appear to gain any 
substantial understanding of the mind as an active, interpretive, constructive processor 
(Barquero & Thomas, 2003; Carpendale & Chandler, 1996). For instance, 
understanding that people's interpretation of an ambiguous event may be influenced by 
their pre-existing biases or expectations seems to be a largely middle-childhood insight 
(Pillow & Henrichon, 1996). Young preschoolers appear to be unclear about just what 
it means for someone to know something and about how knowledge is acquired 
(Flavell & Miller, 1998). Even older preschoolers may claim that they have always 
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known information that they have just learned during the experimental session (Taylor 
& Bennett, 1994). An important early middle-childhood discovery is their burgeoning 
conception of the mind as an interpretive device for knowledge acquisition. Similarly, 
children develop understanding of pretense, Meta thinking and their implications 
sequentially (Harris, 2000; Flavell & Flavell, 1995). 
 
2.4. ASSESSMENT OF THEORY OF MIND: 
Over the past three decades, several tasks or tests for the assessment of Theory of Mind 
have been developed. Their methodology widely varies depending on their differing 
theoretical backdrop. Even though most of these tests were not formally validated and 
there are rousing controversies over their ability to assess Theory of Mind, they did 
facilitate the accumulation of current knowledge and progress of this field. These 
assessments can be broadly classified as tests of false belief, abstract language and high 
order tasks such as emotion recognition and social perception tests.  
 
2.4.1. False belief tests 
Classical prototype method is the test of false belief, proposed by Dennett as a method 
of demonstrating that an individual is able to ascribe mental states to others. False 
beliefs are used because it is necessary to establish that an individual being tested is 
able to attribute beliefs to others that are different from his own beliefs. These tests of 
false beliefs are the most established, and the most theoretically valid method of 
establishing theory of mind ability or impairment. First order false belief tests establish 
whether an individual can correctly predict the actions of a character based upon 
attribution to that character of a false belief. For example, an individual might observe a 
character, Sara, moving a cookie from its hiding place once a second character, Jim, has 
left the room. The individual completing the false belief task would display intact first 
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order false belief attribution if he predicted that Jim, upon re entering the room, would 
look for the cookie in its old location rather than its new hiding place. In order to make 
this correct prediction, the individual must be able to look beyond, or inhibit, his own 
knowledge of reality, and rely instead on his understanding of the false belief held by 
another person. Children can correctly make first order false belief mental state 
attributions at three to four years of age (Wimmer & Ferner, 1983). 
Second order false belief tests are more difficult tasks that establish whether an 
individual can correctly attribute a false belief about a belief. For example, if 
unbeknownst to Sara but known to the individual being tested, Jim peeked back into the 
room and observed Sara changing the hiding place of the cookie; Sara would then 
falsely believe that Jim believes the cookie is still hidden in its original location. Sara 
would hold a false belief about Jim’s belief. Children generally pass second order false 
belief tests at age six or seven (Wimmer & Ferner, 1983). 
 
2.4.2. Abstract language tests 
More complex and subtle tests of theory of mind have been developed recently that 
involve the interpretation of abstract or non-literal language such as sarcasm, irony or 
deceit. Investigators who use these tests of Theory of Mind claim that often, 
interpretation of non-literal language involves understanding what a speaker knows, 
believes, or intends (Baron-Cohen & Plaisted, 1997). Other tests used tasks that 
required understanding irony and metaphor (Happe, 1994b), tasks to distinguish lies 
from jokes (Winner & Pincus, 1998), test of mental lexicon words and faux pas tasks 
which involve understanding of why the speaker should not have said what he said and 
that the speaker does not realize that he has spoken in error, and why the listener would 
feel insulted or hurt (Baron-Cohen & Plaisted, 1997). 
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2.4.3. High order tests 
Further high order tasks include tests of emotion recognition and of social components. 
In Reading the Mind in the Eyes task, subjects view a series of eye region photographs, 
and select from given choices the emotion expressed in the eyes. There are also other 
emotion recognition and emotion behaviour tasks such as empathic accuracy task 
(Buitelaar & van der Gaag, 1999.). Tests for social perception and social cognition are 
also available (Samson & Humphreys, 2005). Although such high- level tasks require 
attribution of mental states, the validity of these tasks as specific measures of theory of 
mind ability has yet to be established. Such tasks are confounded by a coincident 
increase in level of cognitive difficulty and demands on working memory. They require 
the participant to understand non- literal language, to infer implicit meanings, and to 
recognize and understand complex social situations. Even though investigators 
generally attempt to control for confounding cognitive variables such as these, high-
level Theory of Mind tasks require a level of complex cognitive skill that is very 
difficult to control for. Performance on these tasks and other, non traditional theory of 
mind tasks should be interpreted cautiously, as they may require alternative cognitive 
skills in addition to or instead of the attribution of mental states to others. These 
difficulties are partially overcome by adding questions of comprehension, assessing 
general inferencing ability and providing written or pictorial recall materials during 
testing. 
 
2.5. THEORY OF MIND IMPAIRMENT 
Impairment of Theory of Mind may be selective as in pervasive developmental 
disorders or may be indiscriminate as in Alzheimer’s Dementia. Such impairment may 
be state related as in acute psychosis or may be trait related as in intellectual disability. 
It may be congenital as in chromosomal abnormalities or may be acquired following 
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cerebral vascular accidents. It can also be predisposing as in schizotypy or be residual 
as in remitted mood disorders, in relation to other psychiatric disorders. 
 
2.5.1. ToM & pervasive developmental disorders 
Selective Theory of Mind impairment is a core cognitive feature of autism and its 
spectrum conditions (Baron-Cohen, 2001). Autistic children have weak central 
coherence, which is the impaired ability to integrate information in context with intact 
or superior ability to perceive local details (Frith, 1989). Children with autism usually 
have impaired mental physical distinction, appearance reality distinction, spontaneous 
pretend play, imagination and poor performance during false belief, mental lexicon 
tasks and tests of deception and pragmatics. They may fail to reflect one’s own 
imagination (Leslie, 1987) or to switch attention flexibly from ‘reality mode’ to 
‘pretend mode’ (Russell, 1997) or both. Even though these impairments are early 
occurring and universal in autistic children, they are not in any way diagnostic. Such 
impairments are documented in Aspergers’s syndrome (Ponnet et al, 2004) and in 
pervasive developmental disorder NOS.  Parents of children with autism spectrum 
conditions may also show difficulties in attributing mental states in emotion recognition 
tasks (Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997), suggesting genetic vulnerability and broader 
cognitive phenotype. As early diagnosis and intervention of these deficits improve 
performance with limited generalization (Howlin & Hadwin, 1998), study of Theory of 
Mind deficits in pervasive developmental disorders may lead to fruitful clinical and 
research avenues. 
 
2.5.2. ToM & Schizophrenia 
Theory of Mind in individuals with schizophrenia is compromised because of their 
failure to monitor their own and other persons’ mental states and behaviour, which may 
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account for many positive and negative symptoms in schizophrenic disorders (Frith, 
1992). There are alternative views, which construe ToM deficits as a result of executive 
function deficits (Hardy-Bayle´ & Sarfati, 2003) or even hyper ToM in schizophrenia 
causing psychotic symptoms (Abu-Akel, 1999). Specialized tests have been designed to 
test ToM abilities in schizophrenia (Frith & Corcoran 1996; Langdon et al. 1997; 
Sarfati et al.1997). There is good empirical evidence for ToM deficits in schizophrenia 
and that many psychotic symptoms may best be understood in light of a disturbed 
capacity in patients to relate their own intentions to executing behaviour, and to 
monitor others’ intentions (Brune, 2005). Similar deficits phenomenologically 
manifests as schizotypy with psychotic like traits and impoverished social awareness of 
variable expression and severity which denote high vulnerability for psychotic 
disorders (Langdon & Coltheart, 1999). However, it is still debated how an impaired 
ToM in schizophrenia is associated with other aspects of cognition, whether it is a state 
or trait variable, and how this affects the patients’ use of language and social behaviour. 
In addition to these potential research areas, future studies need to address whether 
patients could benefit from cognitive training in this domain. 
 
2.5.3. ToM & Mood disorders 
ToM research in mood disorders awards enthralling etiological and therapeutic 
implications. Akin to schizophrenia, theories of mind deficits were documented in 
bipolar affective disorder during episodes (Kerr & Bentall, 2003) and during remission 
(Bora, et al, 2005). This adds to mounting academic argument that common causative 
mechanisms may contribute to bipolar affective disorder and schizophrenia. ToM 
deficits are also present in unipolar depression during episodes (Lee et al, 2005) and 
during remission (Inoue et al, 2004). Depressed individuals have difficulty to identify 
and decode others' social cues and perform poorly in second order false belief and 
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emotion recognition tasks. Such deficits admonish a decline of skilful social 
relationships. Strategies based on improving basic ToM reasoning could be 
incorporated into current therapeutic interventions for depression to provide better 
social adjustment.  
 
2.5.4. ToM & other disorders 
Theory of mind impairment is extensively studied in divergent clinical conditions such 
as Alzheimer’s dementia (Gregory, et al, 2002), acquired neurological lesions 
(Damasio, 1994), seizure disorder (Farrant, et al, 2005), delusional disorder (Craig, et 
al, 2004), intellectual disability (Yirmiya et al., 1998), behavioural disorders (Hughes & 
white, 1998), Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (Papadopoulos,  et al., 2005), 
personality disorders (Dolan & Fullam, 2004 ), child sexual offenders (Keenan & 
Ward, 2000), normal aging (Happe & Brownell, 1998) and deaf mutism (Courtin & 
Melot, 2005). This highlights the fact that ToM impairment is widely prevalent and has 
high clinical and research priority. 
 
2.6. ToM & COGNITION     
Is Theory of Mind an independent valid specific cognitive ability or a part or product of 
general cognitive abilities? This controversy exists from the commencement, because 
some executive function based theorists contend that a distinct Theory of Mind ability 
does not exist. These theorists instead believe that executive functions are sufficient to 
perform the mental inferencing skills attributed to Theory of Mind, without the 
participation of any specialized cognitive skill (Hughes, 1998; Ozonoff et al., 1991). 
They reject a Theory of Mind construct arguing that the tasks  used to assess Theory of 
Mind ability primarily test executive function component skills such as set-shifting and 
response inhibition. The core, meta-representational ability attributed to Theory of 
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Mind by modularity theorists is also merely interpreted as one example of the general 
cognitive capacity for using embedded rules (Frye & Palfai, 1995). The endeavours till 
date to resolve this debate have indeed granted clinical, neuro psychological and 
research evidence providing strength to both sides of this controversy. 
 
2.6.1. Evidence against ToM as a specific cognitive domain 
The following studies in healthy and in psychiatrically ill individuals support the view 
that Theory of Mind is a part or product of general cognitive abilities. When two groups 
of children were independently trained in Theory of Mind skills and in executive 
functions, both trained groups showed significant improvement in performance on 
Theory of Mind tasks  in comparison with a control group (Fisher & Happe, 2005). A 
review of studies on moral judgments established a bidirectional relationship with 
Theory of Mind and argued that moral judgments actually serve as input to the process 
underlying the application of Theory of Mind concepts (Knobe, 2005). Another review 
of neuro imaging studies of attempted deception tasks found out activation of prefrontal 
and anterior cingulate cortices, which are principally associated with executive 
functions (Spence, et al., 2004). Theory of Mind deficits in schizophrenia found to be 
related to domain general impairments, intelligence and working memory load, rather 
than reflecting a genuine compromised mental state attribution (Brune, 2003). In a 
study of ToM deficits in patients with fronto temporal dementia and Alzheimer’s 
dementia reveal that Theory of Mind deficits correlate with the neuro psychiatric 
inventory scores (Gregory, et al., 2002).  These studies point towards a significant 
correlation between Theory of Mind deficits and general cognitive deficits. Analogous 
executive function and Theory of Mind developmental timelines in children and the 
obscurity inherent in experimentally differentiating Theory of Mind skills from general 
cognitive skills add to this controversy. 
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2.6.2. Evidence for ToM as a specific cognitive domain 
Convincing neuro physiological and neuro imaging studies indicate evidence of 
specific localization of Theory of Mind ability and selective Theory of Mind 
impairment with spared executive function component skills in pervasive 
developmental disorders and in acquired neurological lesions. They contradict the 
claims of general executive function based explanation of Theory of Mind. In a study 
investigating a link between Theory of Mind and episodic memory, most Theory of 
Mind abilities showed no interrelations with episodic memory during development 
(Naito, 2003). Another series of experiments investigating the models regarding the 
role of the amygdala in the development of theory of mind and the degree of 
dissociation between theory of mind and executive functioning, concluded that theory 
of mind is not simply a function of more general executive functions and that executive 
functions can develop and function on-line, independently of theory of mind (Fine & 
Blair, 2001). Evolutionary history of prefrontal cortex also indicates the cognitive 
specialization of Theory of Mind ability (Povinelli & Preuss, 1995). 
The abnormal development of social cognitive component of ToM among autistic 
children is hypothesized as abnormal functioning of the specific orbito frontal and 
medial temporal circuits (Sabbagh, 2004). Patients, who have temporo parietal junction 
lesion with intact frontal lobes, present belief reasoning errors with spared executive 
functions which hoist the possibility that this brain region may have a role in ToM, 
rather than handling the executive demands (Apperly, et al., 2004). Another study of 
Theory of Mind in adults who had suffered right hemisphere stroke, documented 
pragmatic and social difficulties and established that such impairment on ToM tasks 
was not a function of task difficulty. It supported the notion of a dedicated cognitive 
system for theory of mind, and suggested a role for the healthy right hemisphere in 
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ToM (Happe, et al., 1999). In short, even though, any break through evidence to clearly 
demarcate theory of mind as an independent cognitive domain distinguished from 
general cognitive abilities has not so far emerged, there is enough available evidence to 
pose such claim. 
 
2.6.3. ToM & Language ability: 
There is a wealth of literature investigating the relationship between Theory of Mind 
ability and general language ability. In contrast to visuo spatial ability, language 
consistently correlates with social understanding (Tager- Flusberg & Sullivan, 1994). 
Direct studies have established that general language ability is more related to false 
belief tasks than semantics and syntax, per se (Ruffman, et al., 2003). Even the 
knowledge of a second language significantly improves young children's understanding 
of mental representations (Berguno & Bowler,  2004).  
In three available longitudinal studies about the relationship between language and 
Theory of Mind, two studies (Astington & Jenkins, 1996; De villiers & Pyers, 2002) 
reported early language development predicted later theory of mind development 
whereas the reverse relationship rarely held. One study found out a bidirectional 
relationship between language and theory of mind development. It added that such 
relationship was robust even after accounting for the children’s age and the verbal 
complexity of the tasks employed (Slade & Ruffman, 2005).  
Semantic and syntactical language abilities have been postulated to be correlated with 
explicit components of Theory of mind ability.  It has been hypothesized as Theory of 
Mind, or at least, the social knowledge initially develops in an implicit form and only 
later becomes explicit. Initial implicit Theory of Mind insights occur through statistical 
learning processes involving gradual piecing together of various bits of social 
information (Boucher & Dienes, 2003). Once, the implicit understanding is in place, 
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children develop better explicit Theory of Mind skills depending on the extent of their 
language skills which provide the terminology to reflect on and refine implicit 
intuitions (Ruffman, et al., 2003; Hale &Tager-Flusberg, 2003). The major 
confounding factors in these studies are children’s chronological age, intelligence and 
their interactions and period effects with general language ability.  
 
2.7. ToM & Intelligence: 
Intelligence is broadly conceptualized as an overall ability for learning and problem 
solving. There is no single universally accepted definition for intelligence (Barett & 
Breuning, 1983). It is operationally defined, “Intelligence is the aggregate or global 
capacity of the individual to act purposefully, to think rationally, and to deal effectively 
with his environment” (Wechsler, 1958). They are various theories describing the 
nature of intelligence which can be broadly classified as factor theories and process 
oriented theories (Morgan& King, 2002). Intelligence may be expressed as Intelligence 
Quotient (IQ) which is a ratio between a particular score an individual attains and the 
score which an average individual of his age may be assumed to attain on the same test. 
William stern first proposed the concept of intelligence quotient in 1912. IQ is usually 
documented as a percentage score of a ratio between mental and chronological age. 
There are many well-standardized test batteries available at present to quantify IQ and 
to identify verbal and non-verbal performance IQ.   
 
2.7.1. Importance of the relationship between ToM & IQ 
Akin to the debate on Theory of Mind and general cognitive abilities, the relationship 
between Theory of Mind and Intelligence is also complex as well as controversial. The 
relationship between IQ and Theory of Mind is usually addressed in recent research 
under two contexts. First, there is enough accumulated evidence about Theory of Mind 
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deficits in children with intellectual disability and about relatively more pronounced 
Theory of Mind deficits in children who have the co morbidity of low IQ and 
psychiatric disorders such as autism and psychosis. Secondly, most Theory of Mind 
investigators favour matching their sample on IQ or accounting for the role of IQ with 
regression analysis to bye pass this fundamental issue while dealing with more 
advanced research quests. Despite the fact that intelligence is considered to be one of 
the prime confounding factors in any sort of Theory of Mind assessment, the existing 
literature regarding the direct relationship between IQ and Theory of Mind abilities is 
strangely sparse. 
Available studies argue for a model of chronological age, verbal IQ, paternal education, 
maternal mental state language  (Adrian, et al., 2005) and for a model of verbal 
memory, performance IQ, age and gender (Buitelaar, et al., 1999b), as the best 
predictors of variables of Theory of Mind ability. A study of relationship between 
Wechsler IQ profile and Theory of Mind in autistic children, comprehension sub test 
had stronger correlation with Theory of Mind ability than block design subtest (Happe, 
1994). A well-validated TOM test scores has been found to be positively associated 
with Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children IQ scores (Muris, et al, 1999). Another 
study failed to find any significant correlation between IQ and The Eyes Test values in 
unaffected first-degree adult relatives of schizophrenia (Kelemen, et al., 2004). A 
preliminary investigation indicates that even male hormones and Body Mass Index may 
predict Theory of Mind abilities and they have a negative correlation with ToM and 
crystallized intelligence (Azurmendi, et al. 2005). 
 
2.7.2. ToM & intellectual disability: 
Theory of Mind research in children with intellectual disability has focused on three 
major areas. They are the validity of Theory of Mind assessment tests in children with 
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compromised intelligence, the extent of Theory of Mind deficits in such children in 
comparison with normal controls and those with psychiatric morbidity and the disparity 
of those deficits among different aetiologies of intellectual disability.   
A Meta analysis of theory of mind studies in children with intellectual disability asserts 
that Theories of Mind deficits are prominent in children with intellectual disability 
(Yirmiya et al., 1998). Adolescents with intellectual disability performed worse than 
children without intellectual disability even when they were matched for mental age. 
They performed better on first order false belief tests than on second order false belief 
tests (Benson, 1993). Individuals with schizophrenia and pre morbid intellectual 
disability showed greater impairment of Theory of Mind skills than those with 
schizophrenia alone (Doody, et al., 1998). 
Such Theory of Mind deficits differ depending on various aetiology of intellectual 
disability. Theory of mind can be selectively spared relative to general cognitive 
functions in cases of Down’s syndrome and Prader Willi syndrome.  Social cognition 
impairments of children with fragile X syndrome were also reported (Cornish, et. al., 
2005). How ever, the deficits in Down’s syndrome were more global and severe than 
those of fragile X syndrome (Abbeduto L, 2001). There is a conflict of evidence for 
(Tager- Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000) and against (Sullivan & Tager-Flusberg, 1999) 
specific social cognitive component impairment in children with Williams syndrome. 
Children with poor control of Phenyl ketonuria (PKU) were found to be similar to 
autistic children in relation to dopaminergic dysfunction and Theory of Mind 
impairment (Dennis, et al., 1999). 
Moderate reliability was established across a series of three false belief tasks and two 
belief desire reasoning tasks in a study to test the reliability of theory of mind task 
performance by individuals with intellectual disability (Charman & Campbell, 1997).  
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Children with intellectual disability have limited narrative language skills which 
substantially contribute to their failure on the false belief task. Screening out children 
who failed to meet linguistic and cognitive prerequisites for dealing with the 
performance demands of the false belief task yielded only non significant correlations 
between false belief performance and the verbal IQ (Abbeduto, et al., 2004). Further 
work investigating the psychometric properties of similar tasks is required with both 
typically and atypically developing children, given the important interpretations made 
regarding the Theory of Mind skills of children on the basis of their responses in such 
experimental tasks  
 
2.7.3. ToM & children with above average IQ 
Theories of Mind investigators are mostly curious to study the high IQ children with 
Autism or Asperger’s syndrome to document the selective impairment of Theory of 
Mind faculty (Beversdorf, et al., 1998).  Theory of Mind research in psychologically 
healthy children with average and above average IQ is almost exclusively sited beyond 
the boundaries of medical literature. This reality deprives the study of Theory of Mind 
by at least two ways. First, we miss a wealth of data regarding the development, nature 
and pragmatic applications of Theory of Mind in a population, which is less 
contaminated by other confounders. Next, we neglect the need of aiding the field of 
education with appropriate evidence based information.  This virtual lack of medical 
literature on this topic may be due to widely prevalent myths such as children with 
above average IQ represent a homogenous population and high IQ children are smart, 
so they can get by on their own. How ever, the available studies have established that 
high IQ students are not homogenous and providing differentiated instruction is a 
necessity, even in advanced classes (Parke, 1989). They also suggest that they learn 
better when high IQ students’ abilities and interests are stimulated by the appropriate 
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level of challenge (Caine & Caine, 1991) and their brain will maintain its level of 
development only if such students are appropriately cognitively challenged (Clark, 
1997). 
Second-order thinking or Meta cognition is important for the development of critical 
thinking and self-reliant learning. Teaching specific social interactional and 
conversational skills and providing explicit and systematic instruction in the underlying 
social cognitive principles necessary to infer the mental states of others have shown 
effectiveness in the performance on Theory of Mind tasks (Ozonoff & Miller, 1995). 
However, this aspect is generally not given its due priority while planning education 
programs, especially for the gifted students (Starko & Schack, 1989). 
In the past, the concept of giftedness was associated primarily with high IQ. It was 
assumed that gifted students were born with high intelligence, were identifiable by their 
high grades and test scores, and were capable of excelling in all areas of school and of 
life. These assumptions are still prevalent, although they are beginning to change. 
Cognitive science, developmental psychology, and new understandings of educational 
psychology are influencing the way giftedness is defined and conceptualized. It is clear 
that there are different ways of being gifted rather than a definitive list of gifted 
qualities. It is logical to assume Theory of Mind abilities will be superior in children 
who are gifted. Preliminary work with gifted children has also shown that they have 
better Meta cognitive attitude (Schwanenflugel, et al., 1997). However, this claim has 
not been validated with systematic studies. 
 
2.8. Indian scenario 
Even though, there is a dearth of recent research of Theory of Mind in India, Indian 
investigators did not fail to contribute to this promising topic. Their work were either a 
part of cross cultural validation studies of Theory of Mind ability or enthralling 
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endeavours to explain the neuronal basis for mentalizing and spiritual abilities which 
were traditionally given high priority in ancient India.  
In a cross-cultural study of false-belief understanding in five cultures including India, 
children crossed the false belief milestone at approximately five years of age in every 
culture studied (Callaghan, et al., 2005). Another Indian study found out that three and 
four year old children were unable to make mental real distinction and the affluent 
children consistently outperformed their deprived counterparts (Wahi & Johri, 1994). 
Indian neurologists also join their hand in understanding the complexity of theory of 
Mind by proposing promising neuronal origins for this ability (Abraham, 1999; Hirstein 
& Ramachandran, 2001). 
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3. AIMS & OBJECTIVES 
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The objectives of this study are: 
 
 
1. To establish the relationship between the Theory of Mind (ToM) and 
Intelligence Quotient (IQ) in children. 
 
2. To establish the relationship between the Theory of Mind (ToM) and 
various domains of general intelligence in children.  
 
3. To establish the relationship between Theory of Mind (ToM) and adaptive 
behaviour. 
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4. METHODOLOGY 
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4.1. Study design 
This is a cross sectional study. 
 
4.2. Setting 
Vellore    district    lies between 12° 15’ to 13° 15’   North latitudes and 78° 20’ to 79° 
50’ East longitudes in the state of Tamilnadu, India.   The geographical area of this 
district is 6077 sq. Kim. The total population as per 2001 Census is 34, 77,317. Vellore 
district has 1891 primary schools among which 400 are in urban area and 1491 are rural 
primary schools. This study was conducted at Nambikkai Nilayam, which is a facility 
for children with Intellectual Disability, Christian Medical College, Vellore, and other 
three private institutes providing care for children with Intellectual Disability in Vellore 
district. Nambikkai Nilayam is a tertiary care, teaching facility with out any 
geographically defined catchment area.  However, a good proportion of children are not 
referred from other clinics but come on their own for assessment and management.  
Nambikkai Nilayam provides both in patient and day care special education programs 
for the children with intellectual disability. All programs include the parents in therapy 
and a multi disciplinary team comprising child psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, 
special educators, occupational therapists, specialist nurses and other support staff are 
involved in the assessment and management of these children. Nambikkai Nilayam is a 
part of a general hospital and has consultation and liaison with other clinical specialties 
for their children whenever indicated. This study also included 12 Governmental and 
private sector primary schools in Vellore district.  
4.3. Sample size estimation 
Sample size was estimated with ‘Med calc’ statistical software. With an alpha error of 
0.05, a beta error of 0.2, a priori power of 80% and critical value of two-tailed 
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correlation coefficient at 0.3, the sample size requirement is estimated to be eighty four 
to establish the correlation between Theory of Mind and IQ. As we anticipated 20% 
drop out between the two points of assessment, we decided to recruit at least 100 
children for this study. 
 
4.4. Sampling 
A convenient sampling method was employed to establish the relationship between 
theory of Mind and IQ over broad IQ ranges. In this study, we attempted to recruit 
children in three groups differing on their academic performance, which is considered 
as a pragmatic proxy measure of IQ. Approximately thirty children were planned to be 
recruited in each of the three groups. They are children with sub average intelligence, 
average intelligence and the children with above average IQ. 
 
4.5. Sample population 
Children with sub average intelligence were recruited from the above mentioned four 
facilities providing care for the children with intellectual disability. Normally 
developing children and the children with above average IQ were recruited from the 
twelve leading primary schools of Vellore district. 
 
4.6. Selection criteria 
As we tend to elucidate the relationship between two entangled cognitive variables, this 
study desired to keep the confounding variables at the feasible minimum. The selection 
criteria were as follows, 
 
4.6.1. Inclusion criteria 
1. Children from eight to eleven years of age. 
2. Children and their caregivers should be willing to participate in the study. 
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4.6.2. Exclusion criteria 
1. Children with any present or past psychiatric morbidity. 
2. Children with severe or long term physical illness. 
3. Children with neurological deficits such as cerebral palsy, seizure disorder and 
head trauma. 
4. Children with sensory deficits such as visual or hearing impairment. 
5. Children with severe behavioural problems. 
6. Children with present or past history of long term use of any medication. 
7. Children who had already received prior training for Theory of Mind tasks. 
8. Children who were not willing to provide their verbal assent to participate in 
this study.  
 
4.7. Measures 
4.7.1. Socio demographic data 
A semi structured data collection sheet (Appendix 9.2.) was used specifically in this 
study to collect data regarding the socio demographic profile, academic profile, medical 
history, family history, and parental and sibling details. 
 
4.7.2. Binet Kamat Test (BKT) 
Among the various intelligence assessment scales, the Stanford Binet scale of 
intelligence is popularly acknowledged to be the ‘test of choice’ for measuring IQ 
(Barett & Breuning, 1983). The Binet Kamat scale of intelligence is the Indian 
adaptation of the 1934 version of Stanford Binet scale of intelligence (Kamat, 1967). 
Some of the tests, items and materials were amended to suit Indian conditions, such as 
Indian coins, typically Indian pictorial scenes, vocabulary and Indian concepts. This 
scale is suitable to assess intelligence from three years of age to adult level. This scale 
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measures intelligence under six sub scales namely memory, language, conceptual 
thinking, reasoning, numerical reasoning, visuo motor coordination and social 
intelligence. The correlation quotient is nearly 0.5 for the IQ (Kamat, 1967). 
 
4.7.3. Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scale (VABS)  
Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scale was the primary tool for measure of adaptive 
behaviour (Sparrow, et al, 1984). It assesses the social competence of individuals with 
and without disabilities from birth to age 19. There are three versions of the revised 
VABS, the Interview Edition, Survey Form; the Interview Edition, Expanded Form; 
and the Class Room Edition. This study employed the Survey form which provides a 
general assessment of adaptive behaviour which is useful for determining areas of 
strength and weakness. VABS has 297 items under four major domains and 11 sub 
domains: Communication, which has expressive, receptive and written sub domains, 
Daily Living Skills, which has personal, domestic and community sub domains, 
Socialization, which has interpersonal, play & leisure and coping sub domains and 
Motor Skills which has fine and gross motor sub domains. An Adaptive Behaviour 
Composite is a combination of the scores from the four domains. The 12 page survey 
form record booklet is used by the trained interviewer to record item scores and 
informal observations.  It has a score summary page for recording and profiling derived 
scores.  The Survey Form Manual provides detailed information necessary to 
administer and score the Survey Form and to interpret the results.  The manual also 
contains technical information about development and standardization. For each of the 
four Adaptive Behaviour domains and Adaptive Behaviour Composite, standard scores, 
percentile ranks, stanines, adaptive levels, and age equivalents are given.  For each of 
the sub domains, the user may determine adaptive levels and age equivalents.  The 
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optional Maladaptive Behaviour domain of the Survey Form determines maladaptive 
levels.   
VABS has good internal consistency, test-retest reliability, and inter rater reliability. 
Two statistics were typically used to report reliability – the reliability coefficient and 
the standard error of measurement (SEM).  The test-retest reliability coefficients for the 
domains and adaptive behaviour composite are very good, with the majority of the 
coefficients in the .80s and .90s.  For the adaptive behaviour composite, test-retest and 
inter rater reliability coefficients were .99 and .98 respectively.  Median correlations 
between pairs of domains ranged from .39 to .55, indicating only a modest overlap 
among the domains.    
 
4.7.4. Strength Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ) 
The strength difficulty questionnaire (Goodman, 1997) is a brief questionnaire to screen 
for psychological strengths and child psychiatric disorders in a community sample. 
SDQ has been translated in more than 40 languages, including Tamil. Computerized 
algorithms are available to predict psychiatric disorders with the information obtained 
from SDQ. SDQ has three versions, care giver version for children aged 3–4, parent/ 
teacher version for children aged 4-16 and self report version for children aged 11- 16. 
This study employed the parent/ teacher version of SDQ meant for children aged 4 – 
16. It has 25 items which refer to different emotions or behaviours. For each item the 
respondent marks in one of three boxes to indicate whether the item is not true, 
somewhat true or certainly true. Somewhat true is always scored 1, but whether not true 
and certainly true are scored 0 or 2 depends on whether the item is framed as a strength 
or difficulty. The overall score indicates whether the child is likely to have a significant 
problem by placing the child in one of the three categories, high needs, some needs and 
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low needs among five subscales for Pro-social Behaviour, Hyperactivity, Emotional 
Symptoms, Conduct and Peer problems. This is useful to employ further diagnostic 
assessment for high needs children and to plan treatment with the special consideration 
of their strengths. SDQ can identify children with psychiatric morbidity with a 
specificity of 94.6% and a sensitivity of 63.3% and can identify more than 70% of 
children with conduct, hyperactivity, depressive and anxiety disorders (Goodman, et 
al., 2000). 
 
4.7.5. Picture Sequencing Task (PST) 
Picture sequencing task measures the Theory of Mind by assessing false belief 
reasoning and general sequencing ability. The PST employed in this study was adapted 
with the permission and the guidance of Dr. Robyn Langdon, cognitive psychologist, 
Macquarie University, Sydney, who developed and extensively used the original 
version in her Theory of Mind research endeavours (Langdon & Coltheart, 1999).  
PST employed 14 sequences which included two practice, four false belief, four 
mechanical and four social script sequences. Each sequence was made up of a series of 
four pictures made up of black and white sketches. These sequences were presented to 
all children in a same prefixed order. The pictures within a sequence were shuffled with 
out the knowledge of the child and the child was asked to reorganize them in a 
meaningful order. The reorganized order and response time for each sequence were 
recorded. If the child placed the first or the last pictures in their correct position, he/ she 
received two points each. One point each was awarded for placing the middle ones in 
their correct position and hence, a total of six points were given for correctly 
reorganized sequence. There were no points for the first two practice sequences.  
Means of scores obtained and mean response times for false belief, mechanical and 
social script sequences were calculated separately. Averaging the mean scores of 
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mechanical and social script sequences derived a general sequencing ability. A 
selective accuracy measure of Theory of Mind ability was calculated by subtracting the 
general sequencing ability from the mean score obtained from false belief sequences. 
Similarly, a selective time measure was calculated in the same way using the mean 
response times. 
PST is a relatively novel experimental task and the psychometric properties of this task 
have not yet been evaluated in depth. The discriminant validity and construct validity of 
PST has been demonstrated in studies of Theory of Mind functioning in schizophrenia 
(Harrington, et al., 2005). There are no test-retest reliability statistics currently 
available. Yet, PST was considered to be the most appropriate test for this study in 
view of the following rationale, 
1. PST places less demand on general language ability and working memory, 
which are known confounders in any Theory of Mind assessment.  
2. Selective accuracy measure of Theory of Mind ability obtained from PST, is 
disentangled from the general sequencing ability and has more conceptual 
authenticity. 
3. PST provides an objective outcome of Theory of Mind ability as a single 
continuous numerical variable, akin to IQ and is more suitable for correlation 
analysis. 
4. PST uses simple sketches, which lack exquisite details, and appears less 
culturally unfair for Indian children.   
5. Such simple pictures and less demand on language ability and working memory 
allow participation of children with intellectual disability and valid use of one 
single uniform test among children over broad IQ ranges.  
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However, the need for further psychometric evaluation of most of Theory of Mind 
assessment tasks, including the PST cannot be denied and is indeed desired. 
 
4.7.6. Unexpected contents Theory of Mind Task 
Even though tests of deception are simple, and brief, they are valid indicators of Theory 
of Mind functioning. The “Unexpected contents Theory of Mind Task” employed in 
this study was creative, but it followed a set of questions used in previous studies 
(Zelazoa, et al., 2002). The child was offered the carton of a crayon box, which had 
pictures of crayons over it. At first, he/ she was asked to tell about the contents of the 
box without opening it. Most of them answered that the box contained crayons but were 
tricked when they opened the box and found two erasers in side. They were asked to 
name the real contents and were once again asked what they thought being inside when 
they had first seen that box. They were also asked what another child would answer 
about the contents of the box if he/ she had not opened that. Their answers to these four 
questions were considered as appearance, reality, representational change and false 
belief variables and were scored with one point each for every correct response. This 
deception task was used to screen the ability of the children to participate in further 
assessment and to gain additional information regarding their Theory of Mind ability. 
 
4.8. Assessment 
Selected children were assessed in two sessions, either at their treating facilities or at 
their school. Each session lasted for approximately 60 – 90 minutes. During the first 
assessment session, the principal investigator of this study, obtained the informed 
consent, collected the socio demographic data and employed the Strength Difficulty 
Questionnaire parent/ teacher version and unexpected contents Theory of Mind task. 
Further assessment with Picture Sequencing Task was carried out only if the child was 
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devoid of psychiatric morbidity as evidenced by low needs in SDQ and was able to 
participate in Theory of Mind assessment tasks as arbitrarily defined by a score of two 
or more in unexpected contents Theory of Mind task. Order of sequencing and response 
times were recorded for every sequence of PST. 
Second assessment session was carried out by an independent co investigator, a senior 
faculty of our department, who possessed more than 25 years of experience in the field 
of special education. Blinded to the Theory of Mind ability of the child, he employed 
Binet Kamat Test for intelligence and Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scale for adaptive 
functioning. Those results remained blinded to the principal investigator till the end of 
final statistical analysis.  
   
4.9. Ethical considerations 
Children and their parents or guardians were explained about the nature and purpose of 
this study, procedure to be followed, expected duration of involvement and the possible 
benefits of this study, by the principal investigator.  Verbal assent from the 
participating children and written informed consent in a specific consent form 
(Appendix 9.1) from the parents were obtained before recruitment. They were assured 
of the confidentiality of their personal information and findings and were informed that 
this information would be processed only for the research purposes in connection with 
this study. The data was protected by reversible anonymisation to ensure 
confidentiality. The parents were also educated about their right to withdraw their 
consent at any point of time without any prior notice. The protocol of this study was 
presented to and was approved by the institutional review board of Christian Medical 
College, Vellore. 
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4.10. Data analysis 
The data were analysed at three levels. Firstly, the socio-demographic data, cognitive 
profile, adaptive behaviours and ToM details for the study sample were analysed using 
descriptive statistics. 
Secondly, the socio-demographic data, cognitive profile, adaptive behaviours and ToM 
details between groups with different levels of IQ were analysed using parametric tests, 
because the obtained data were not significantly skewed. Chi-square tests for 
categorical measures and one-way ANOVA for continuous variables were carried out. 
The linear correlation between the ToM and various domains of IQ was analysed using 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient tests with two tailed assumptions.  
Thirdly, the linear correlation between the ToM and various domains of IQ was 
analysed using two tailed partial correlation test to control the possible confounders, 
which significantly differed between the three groups. Also, with ToM as the dependent 
variable and IQ as the independent variable as well as, chronological age, parent’s 
education, type of school, number of siblings and monthly income as possible 
confounders for ToM because of the baseline differences between groups, multiple 
linear regression analysis was conducted. All tests used a two tailed analysis and a P 
value of less than 0.05 was considered significant. The data analysis was conducted 
using the statistical software package, SPSS 11.0. 
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5. RESULTS 
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5.1. Sample flow 
All the 105 children who met the selection criteria were invited to take part in the 
study. All of them consented to participate and underwent the first assessment session. 
The children with sub-average intelligence were recruited from four institutes caring 
for children with intellectual disability. The children with average and above average 
intelligence were recruited from twelve primary schools in the Vellore district. 
 
5.2. Sample attrition 
However, only 95 children completed the second assessment session, because the 
parents of four children withdrew their consent, four children lost to follow up because 
of changing their residence to places outside the catchment area, and two children were 
excluded when the past history of seizure disorder was made available. The overall 
dropout rate was 9.52%. 
 
5.3. Sample characteristics 
The socio demographic profile of the children and their families, who participated in 
this study, was presented in table I and table II respectively. 
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Table I: Socio demographic profile of children (N=105) participated in this study. 
 
VARIABLE N (%) 
Gender 
      Male 
      Female 
 
47 (45) 
58 (55) 
Chronological age (in years) 
 
Mean (SD) 10.19 (0.86) 
Religion 
      Hindu 
      Christian 
      Muslim 
 
89 (84) 
2 (2) 
14 (13) 
Language 
       Tamil 
       Bengali 
       Others 
 
79 (75) 
3 (3) 
23 (22) 
Birth order  
                   First 
                   Middle 
                   Last  
 
63 (60) 
10 (10) 
32 (30) 
Type of school 
                   Special 
                   Private 
                  Government  
                   No formal education 
 
5 (5) 
65 (62) 
30 (29) 
5(5) 
Medical illness during the past 1 
month 
                    Present 
                    Absent 
 
1 (1) 
104 (99) 
 
 
 
 
The mean age of the participants was 10.19 (SD = 0.86) years. There were 47 (45%) 
boys and 58 (55%) girls in this study, thus there was a mild female preponderance in 
this study. Most of them spoke Tamil (75%), belonged to Hindu (84%) religion, and 
studied in private (62%) schools. A very little number of participants (1%) had any 
medical problems or consumed any medication within one month of assessment. 
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Table II: Socio demographic profile of families of children (N=105) participated in 
this study. 
 
VARAIABLE N (%) 
Type of family 
Nuclear 
Joint 
Broken 
 
88 (84) 
16 (15) 
1 (1) 
Father’s age (in years)                       Mean (SD) 40. 92 (6.30) 
Father’s education 
Illiterate 
Primary 
Middle 
High school 
Higher secondary 
Graduate 
Professional 
 
6 (6) 
8 (8) 
7 (7) 
19 (18) 
16 (15) 
34 (32) 
15 (14) 
Mother’s age (in years)                        Mean (SD) 34.93 (5.19) 
Mother’s education 
Illiterate 
Primary 
Middle 
High school 
Higher secondary 
Graduate 
Professional 
 
6 (6) 
15 (14) 
8 (8) 
18 (17) 
13 (12) 
36 (34) 
9 (9) 
Number of siblings  
Nil 
One 
Two 
More than two 
 
16 (15) 
60 (57) 
23 (22) 
6 (6) 
Monthly income (in Rs)                          Mean (SD) 13910 (20013) 
Family history  
Psychiatric morbidity 
Intellectual disability 
Seizure disorder 
No neuro psychiatric morbidity 
 
3 (3) 
 5 (5) 
3 (3) 
94 (89) 
 
Most of the children were from nuclear (84%) middle socio economic status families 
but there was large variation in their monthly income (Mean Rs. 13910; SD = 20013). 
The majority of children had literate parents (94%), less than two siblings (94%) and 
lacked any significant family history of neuro psychiatric morbidity (89%).  
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5.4. Psychological measures of the participants. 
The mean IQ of the participants was 92.76 (SD = 29.04) with a range of 32 to 144. The 
picture sequencing task and Binet Kamat Test of intelligence profile of the overall 
sample was as follows: 
Table III: Psychological variables of children participated in this study. 
 
MEASURE MEAN (SD) 
Social script 4.07 (1.78) 
Mechanical 3.85 (1.71) 
False belief 3.20 (1.47) 
General Sequencing Ability 3.96 (1.64) 
Picture 
Sequencing Task  
(N=105) 
Theory of Mind ability - 0.75 (1.30) 
MA (in years) 9.53 (3.12) 
Language (in years) 10.01 (3.52) 
Meaningful memory (in years) 9.23 (2.66) 
Non meaningful memory (in years) 8.34 (2.72) 
Conceptual thinking (in years) 10.99 (2.24) 
Non verbal thinking (in years) 8.89 (4.36) 
Verbal reasoning (in years) 12.32 (1.09) 
Non verbal reasoning (in years) 9.25 (2.98) 
Visuo motor (in years) 8.90 (1.87) 
Social intelligence (in years) 9.76 (2.91) 
Binet Kamat Test 
(N=95) 
Intelligence Quotient (IQ) 92.76 (29.04) 
 
The Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scale (VABS) adaptive measures were presented in 
table IV. 
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Table IV: Adaptive variables of children (N = 95) participated in this study 
 
ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOUR DOMAIN MEAN AGE EQUIVALENT IN 
MONTHS (SD) 
Communication 
Receptive 
Expressive 
Written 
99.64 (36.77) 
82.33 (22.90) 
87.72 (30.07) 
100.09 (38.35) 
Daily living skills 
Personal 
Domestic 
Community 
106.73 (37.09) 
139.80 (64.72) 
102.79 (39.53) 
100.95 (37.36) 
Socialization 
Interpersonal relationships 
Play & leisure time 
Coping skills 
106.53 (44.36) 
104.03 (44.17) 
  89. 78 (35.70) 
124.26 (58.18) 
Motor (n=23) 
Gross motor 
Fine motor 
51.50 (13.09) 
55.48 (17.55) 
49.35 (15.01) 
Adaptive Behaviour composite (ABC) 104.8 (37.38) 
 
 
The data from Strength Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ) was recoded in to three 
categorical variables, as low needs, some needs and high needs, according to the 
guidelines. All the participants presented as low needs on hyper activity, conduct 
problems, emotional symptoms, peer problems and total difficulties domains and had 
favourable scores on pro social domain (mean 9.14; SD=0.86) which efficiently 
screened out psychiatric morbidity among them, as shown in table V. 
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Table V: Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire profile of the children (n=105). 
 
Scale N (%) 
Pro social : Low needs  
       Mean (SD) 
105 (100%) 
9.14 (0.86) 
Hyper activity: Low needs 105 (100%) 
Conduct problems: Low needs 105 (100%) 
Emotional symptoms: Low needs 105 (100%) 
Peer problems: Low needs 105 (100%) 
Total difficulties: Low needs 105 (100%) 
 
5.5. Socio demographic characteristics between groups 
Socio demo graphic profiles of three groups of children with, sub average (N=33), 
average (N=31) and above average IQ (N=31) were compared in table VI and table VII. 
Table VI: Comparison of socio demographic profile of children among three 
groups. 
 
VARIABLE SUB 
AVERAGE 
IQ 
AVERAGE 
IQ 
ABOVE 
AVERAGE 
IQ 
χ2 / Fa, df p 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
 
15 
18 
 
17 
14 
 
10 
21 
 
2.87, 2 
 
0.2 
Age in years 
Mean (SD) 
10.16 
 (0.74) 
10.70 
 (0.59) 
9.85 
 (0.89) 
10.28, 2 0.001 
Birth order 
First 
Middle 
            Last 
 
20 
5 
8 
 
21 
2 
8 
 
18 
0 
13 
 
 
7.46, 4 
 
 
0.1 
School 
Private 
Govt. 
No formal 
education 
 
9 
19 
5 
 
20 
2 
8 
 
31 
0 
0 
 
 
39.01, 4 
 
 
0.001 
Medical illness 
Present 
Absent 
 
1 
32 
 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
 
1.87, 2 
 
0.4 
a = Test conducted were Chi-square test for categorical and one-way ANOVA for continuous 
variables. 
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Table VII: Comparison of socio demographic profile of families of children among 
three groups. 
 
VARIABLE SUB 
AVERAGE 
IQ 
AVERAGE 
IQ 
ABOVE 
AVERAGE 
IQ 
χ2 / Fa, df p 
Family: Nuclear 
 Joint 
 Broken 
29 
3 
1 
24 
7 
0 
25 
6 
0 
 
4.02, 4 
 
0.4 
Father’s age in years 
Mean (SD) 
40.45 (8.56) 40.35 (4.60) 42.42 (5.62) 1.41,2 0.2 
Father’s education 
Illiterate 
Primary 
Middle 
High school 
H. secondary 
Graduate 
Professional 
 
6 
6 
4 
8 
5 
3 
1 
 
0 
1 
2 
7 
4 
15 
2 
 
0 
0 
0 
1 
4 
15 
11 
 
 
 
53.88, 
12 
 
 
 
0.01 
Mother’s age in years 
Mean (SD) 
32.64 (6.06) 35.61 (4.86) 37.16 (4.17) 7.11, 2 0.001 
Mother’s education 
Illiterate 
Primary 
Middle 
High school 
H. secondary 
Graduate 
Professional 
 
5 
10 
5 
5 
5 
3 
0 
 
1 
3 
2 
6 
4 
13 
2 
 
0 
0 
0 
3 
3 
18 
7 
 
 
 
45.55, 
12 
 
 
 
0.001 
Number of siblings  
Nil 
One 
Two 
More than two 
 
3 
16 
10 
4 
 
4 
16 
10 
1 
 
7 
23 
1 
0 
 
16.10, 6 
 
0.01 
Monthly income in Rs 
Mean (SD) 
2874 
(4786) 
12048 
(17598) 
26725 
(21909) 
17.89, 2 0.001 
Family history  
Psychiatric 
Intellectual 
disability 
Seizure  
Nil 
 
1 
3 
 
1 
28 
 
1 
1 
 
1 
28 
 
0 
0 
 
1 
30 
 
4.36, 6 
 
0.6 
a = Tests conducted were Chi-square test for categorical and one-way ANOVA for continuous 
variables; H. secondary= Higher secondary. 
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Due to convenient sampling and their inherent predispositions, three groups had 
significantly differed in many socio demographic variables, such as chronological age 
(P= 0.001), type of school (P= 0.001), monthly income (P= 0.001), father’s education 
(P= 0.01), mother’s education (P= 0.001), number of siblings (P= 0.01) and mother’s 
age (P= 0.001). However, these groups did not significantly vary on gender, birth order, 
father’s age, type of family, presence of medical illness, and on their family history of 
neuro psychiatric morbidity. 
 
5.6. Psychological measures between groups 
As these groups were principally categorized according to their IQ scores, they were 
bound to differ significantly on their Intelligence profile and indeed; they differed 
significantly (P= 0.001) on all domains of Binet Kamat Test of Intelligence. Tests on 
verbal reasoning domain were not possible with most of the children with sub average 
intelligence and they were employed only in the other two groups. There was similar 
significant (P= 0.001) difference among the measures of Picture Sequencing Task, 
including the mean scores of false belief, social script and mechanical sequences, the 
general sequencing ability and the selective accuracy measure of Theory of Mind 
ability. Those results were revealed in table VIII. 
These groups also varied significantly (P= 0.001) on all domains and sub domains of 
Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scales predictably because of the IQ based 
categorization of the sample. Table IX exhibits the contrast among the adaptive 
measures of three groups. Age equivalents for motor domain and fine motor and gross 
motor sub domains were available only for the children with sub average intelligence 
and so they were not presented in the table. 
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Table VIII: Comparison of psychological profile of children among three groups. 
 
DOMAIN SUB 
AVERAGE 
IQ 
Mean (SD) 
AVERAGE 
IQ 
 
Mean (SD) 
ABOVE 
AVERAGE 
IQ 
Mean (SD) 
F (df=2) p 
Social script 2.69 (1.88) 4.94 (0.93) 4.94 (1.03) 30.35 0.001 
Mechanical 2.32 (1.34) 4.89 (1.04) 4.84 (1.03) 52.80 0.001 
False belief 1.89 (0.92) 3.41 (1.17) 4.54 (0.97) 56.44 0.001 
GSA 2.50 (1.49) 4.92 (0.78) 4.89 (0.91) 50.72 0.001 
Theory of Mind  -0.61 (1.51) -1.50 (1.17) - 0.35 (0.79) 7.86 0.001 
MA (in years) 5.90 (2.19) 10.64 (0.64) 12.28 (1.21) 153.40 0.001 
Lang (in years) 6.03 (2.79) 11.29 (1.19) 12.97 (1.02) 119.16 0.001 
Meaningful 
memory (in years) 
6.36 (2.98) 10.23 (0.72) 10.84 (1.00) 50.71 0.001 
Non meaningful 
memory (in years) 
5.83 (2.12) 8.90 (0.30) 10.41 (2.78) 39.29 0.001 
Conceptual 
thinking (in years) 
7.77 (1.01) 10.68 (1.11) 12.65 (1.82) 53.39 0.001 
NV thinking (in 
years) 
4.58 (1.50) 11.60 (1.27) 12.70 (2.62) 102.03 0.001 
NV reasoning (in 
years) 
6.47 (1.96) 12.00 (0.00) 12.44 (1.28) 61.67 0.001 
Visuo motor (in 
years) 
6.60 (2.04) 9.57 (1.07) 9.83 (0.66) 43.56 0.001 
SI  (in years) 6.33 (2.20) 11.35 (1.08) 11.81 (0.60) 137.83 0.001 
IQ 59.81 
(20.93) 
99.51 
(5.79) 
121.09 
(8.41) 
165.41 0.001 
 
GSA- General Sequencing Ability; MA- Mental Age; Lang- Language; NV- Non Verbal; SI- 
Social Intelligence; IQ- Intelligence Quotient. 
a = Test conducted was one-way ANOVA as all variables were continuous in nature. 
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Table IX: Comparison of adaptive profile of children among three groups. 
 
DOMAIN/ 
SUB DOMAIN 
SUB 
AVERAGE 
IQ 
Mean* (SD) 
AVERAGE 
IQ 
 
Mean* (SD) 
ABOVE 
AVERAGE 
IQ 
Mean* (SD) 
Fa (df=2) p 
Receptive  60.70 
(28.25) 
 93.68  
(1.79) 
 94.00  
(0.00) 
41.74 0.001 
Expressive  57.70 
(33.45) 
101.52 
(9.35) 
105.87 
(4.86) 
52.98 0.001 
Written  58.67 
(34.81) 
113.68 
(13.60) 
130.61 
(9.45) 
87.88 0.001 
Communication  58.97 
(32.73) 
114.97 
(12.60) 
127.61 
(7.96) 
95.11 0.001 
Personal  75.97 
(43.53) 
148.71 
(45.56) 
198.84 
(29.33) 
73.53 0.001 
Domestic  65.82 
(39.67) 
114.32 
(22.08) 
130.61 
(17.03) 
44.83 0.001 
Community  63.39 
(39.51) 
114.35 
(8.58) 
127.52 
(12.93) 
58.81 0.001 
Daily living skills  67.88 
(35.54) 
118.48 
(11.91) 
136.32 
(10.69) 
76.30 0.001 
Inter personal  60.21 
(33.54) 
115.19 
(24.14) 
139.52 
(28.07) 
64.55 0.001 
Play & Leisure  52.48 
(31.93) 
103.19 
(14.49) 
116.06 
(16.31) 
71.85 0.001 
Coping skills  62.52 
(53.97) 
145.35 
(22.24) 
168.90 
(17.11) 
77.35 0.001 
Socialization  58.48 
(38.45) 
122.16 
(15.06) 
142.03 
(16.36) 
90.23 0.001 
Adaptive behaviour  
Composite 
 63.70 
(32.89) 
118.29 
(12.07) 
135.10 
(9.11) 
98.19 0.001 
* Mean of age equivalents in months 
a = Test conducted were Chi-square test for categorical and one-way ANOVA for continuous 
variables. 
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5.7. Bivariate correlation between ToM and IQ 
When the continuous variables of Theory of Mind and intelligence Quotient were 
analyzed for their bivariate linear correlation with two tailed Pearson correlation 
coefficient, there was no significant (P= 0.2) relationship between ToM and IQ. Further 
analysis for the linear relationship between various domains of intelligence and ToM 
revealed that ToM had significant correlations with visuo motor (P=0.02) and social 
intelligence (P=0.003) domains. They were summarized in table X. 
 
Table X: Bivariate correlation between Theory of Mind ability and intelligence 
domains (N=95). 
 
DOMAIN ra P 
Language -0.16 0.1 
Meaningful memory  -0.20 0.06 
Non meaningful memory  -0.14 0.2 
Conceptual thinking 0.21 0.08 
Non verbal thinking  -0.25 0.07 
Verbal  reasoning 0.10 0.5 
Non verbal reasoning -0.09 0.4 
Visuo motor  -0.26 0.02 
Social Intelligence  -0.29 0.003 
Intelligence Quotient -0.14 0.2 
a Pearson correlation coefficient (two tailed) 
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5.8. Partial correlation between ToM and IQ 
As there were significant differences of socio demographic and adaptive variables 
among three study groups, partial correlation analysis was carried out while controlling 
for the effects of chronological age, mother’s age, income, father’s education, Mother’s 
education, type of schooling, number of siblings and Vineland Adaptive Behaviour 
Scale Adaptive Behaviour Composite age equivalent. These variables were chosen due 
to their statistically significant differences and for their importance of being major 
confounders as shown in review of literature. Partial correlation analysis also 
demonstrated no significant relationship between Theory of Mind and Intelligence 
Quotient and between Theory of Mind and most of the domains of intelligence. 
However, the Theory of Mind’s correlation with visuo motor and social intelligence 
domains attained more statistical significance with partial correlation. 
 
When this partial correlation analysis was further controlled for the effects of Picture 
Sequencing task, General Sequencing Ability, Visuo motor domain lost (Partial 
correlation coefficient = -0.02; P= 0.8) its significant correlation with Theory of Mind 
ability. However, when this partial correlation was further controlled for Vineland 
Adaptive Behaviour Scale socialization domain age equivalent, Social Intelligence 
domain still held a significant correlation (Partial correlation coefficient = -0.36; 
P=0.001) with Theory of Mind ability. These relationships were depicted in table XI. 
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Table XI: Partial correlation between Theory of Mind ability and intelligence 
domains (N=95). 
DOMAIN Rhoa P 
Language 0.13 0.2 
Meaningful memory  -0.17 0.1 
Non meaningful memory  -0.01 0.9 
Conceptual thinking -0.05 0.7 
Non verbal thinking  -0.05 0.7 
Verbal  reasoning 0.03 0.9 
Non verbal reasoning 0.04 0.7 
Visuo motor  -0.29 0.01 
Social Intelligence   -0.38 0.001 
Intelligence Quotient 0.01 0.9 
Controlled for chronological age, mother’s age, income, father’s education, Mother’s 
education, type of schooling, number of siblings and Adaptive Behaviour Composite age 
equivalent. 
a Partial correlation coefficient (two tailed) 
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5.9. Analysis of relationship between ToM and IQ within groups 
Similar correlation analysis was performed within three study groups. Theory of Mind 
did not have significant relationship with Intelligence quotient in any group, while 
accounting for the confounders. In the sub average intelligence group, Theory of mind 
had significant correlation with non-verbal thinking (P=0.02) and with social 
intelligence (P=0.003), as revealed in table XII. 
 
Table XII: Partial correlation between Theory of Mind ability and intelligence 
domains in the sub average intelligence group. 
 
DOMAIN Rhoa P 
Language 0.06 0.8 
Meaningful memory  -0.08 0.7 
Non meaningful memory  -0.28 0.2 
Conceptual thinking -0.75 0.1 
Non verbal thinking  -0.56 0.02 
Verbal  reasoning - - 
Non verbal reasoning -0.08 0.7 
Visuo motor  -0.36 0.2 
Social Intelligence   -0.57 0.003 
Intelligence Quotient -0.26 0.2 
Controlled for chronological age, mother’s age, income, father’s education, Mother’s 
education, type of schooling, number of siblings and Adaptive Behaviour Composite age 
equivalent. 
a Partial correlation coefficient (two tailed) 
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Even if this analysis was further controlled for General Sequencing Ability, Non-verbal 
thinking domain held (Partial correlation coefficient = -0.65; P= 0.008) more 
significant correlation with Theory of Mind ability. Similarly, when this partial 
correlation was further controlled for Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scale socialization 
domain age equivalent, Social Intelligence domain still held a significant correlation 
(Partial correlation coefficient = -0.51; P=0.01) with Theory of Mind ability. How ever, 
there were no such significant correlations between any domains of intelligence and 
Theory of Mind ability in average and above average groups. Those results were 
presented in table XIII and in table XIV. 
 
Table XIII: Partial correlation between Theory of Mind ability and intelligence 
domains in the average intelligence group. 
 
DOMAIN Rhoa P 
Language -0.03 0.8 
Meaningful memory  -0.26 0.2 
Non meaningful memory  0.05 0.8 
Conceptual thinking -0.27 0.2 
Non verbal thinking  - - 
Verbal  reasoning - - 
Non verbal reasoning -0.35 0.09 
Visuo motor  -0.26 0.2 
Social Intelligence  -0.03 0.9 
Intelligence Quotient -0.27 0.2 
Controlled for chronological age, mother’s age, income, father’s education, Mother’s 
education, type of schooling, number of siblings and Adaptive Behaviour Composite age 
equivalent. 
a Partial correlation coefficient (two tailed) 
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Table XIV: Bivariate correlation between Theory of Mind ability and intelligence 
domains in the above average group. 
 
DOMAIN ra P 
Language 0.15 0.4 
Meaningful memory  -0.03 0.9 
Non meaningful memory  0.07 0.7 
Conceptual thinking -0.29 0.1 
Non verbal thinking  -0.01 0.9 
Verbal  reasoning 0.04 0.8 
Non verbal reasoning -0.12 0.5 
Visuo motor  -0.05 0.8 
Social Intelligence   -0.20 0.3 
Intelligence Quotient 0.05 0.8 
a Pearson correlation coefficient (two tailed) 
#Partial correlation could not be computed in this group. 
 
 
5.10. Regression analysis of ToM ability 
Theory of Mind ability as dependent variable was explored using multiple linear 
regression analyses with chronological age, monthly income, father’s education, 
mother’s education, type of school and number of siblings as independent variables, 
because they were not balanced between groups. Multiple liner regression was 
considered over the logistic regression because of the large number of confounders that 
needed control and the participant numbers were inadequate for a logistic regression. 
Thus the theory of mind was treated as a continuous variable in the regression. 
Four models were tested with Theory of Mind as the dependent variable. They were 
one model only with confounders (chronological age, monthly income, father’s 
education, mother’s education, type of school and number of siblings), one model with 
confounders and Intelligence Quotient, one model with confounders and Vineland 
Adaptive Behaviour Scale Adaptive Behaviour Composite age equivalent and another 
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model with confounders and Binet Kamat Test social intelligence. Among these four 
models, the one with social intelligence was most successful in predicting the Theory of 
Mind ability with statistical significance. These results of regression analysis were 
summarized in Table XV. 
 
Table XV: Regression analysis of Theory of Mind ability as dependent variable. 
 
MODEL β (SE) t P R2 
All confoundersa - - 0.09 0.10 
Intelligence Quotientb -0.22 (0.01) -1.45 0.17 0.11 
Adaptive Behaviourc -0.21 (0.01) -1.48 0.16 0.11 
Social Intelligenced -0.54 (0.07) -3.63 0.004 0.21 
a A model comprising chronological age, monthly income, father’s education, mother’s 
education, type of school and number of siblings. 
b A model comprising all confounders and Intelligence Quotient. 
c A model comprising all confounders and Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scale Adaptive 
Behaviour Composite age equivalent. 
d A model comprising all confounders and Binet Kamat Scale Social Intelligence. 
Constant was included in each model. 
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6.DISCUSSION 
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6.1. Interpretation of results 
To address our first objective, this study has examined the direct relationship between 
Theory of Mind ability and Intelligence among a sample of 105 psychologically healthy 
children with a wide range of IQ. It has demonstrated that there was no significant 
correlation between these two cognitive modalities among the overall sample and 
within all three groups.  
In this study, to focus on the second objective, we also explored the relationship 
between Theory of Mind ability and various domains of intelligence in children with 
sub average, average and above average intelligence. Two intelligence domains 
attained statistically significant correlation with Theory of Mind ability while 
controlling for the confounders. They were visuo motor and social intelligence 
domains. The significance of correlation of visuo motor domain could be linked to the 
general sequencing ability, which was essential for the performance in the Picture 
Sequencing Task and was not evident in the analysis within all three groups. Nonverbal 
thinking domain attained significant correlation with Theory of Mind ability only in 
children with sub average intelligence. Hence, the social intelligence domain can be 
contended to have the strongest relationship with Theory of Mind ability, especially in 
children with sub average intelligence.  
When we looked at our third objective, adaptive behaviour composite age equivalent 
was also demonstrated to have no direct relationship with theory of Mind ability. The 
significant differences among the socio demographic and psychological variables 
between these study groups, did not account for these findings, as evidenced by the 
partial correlation and regression analyses. Hence, this study has presented three major 
findings. First, Theory of Mind ability is not related to general intelligence of a child. 
Second, Theory of Mind ability is not correlated with most of the intelligence and 
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adaptive domains. Third, Theory of Mind ability has a strong relationship with social 
intelligence. These findings argue that Theory of Mind may exist as independent 
cognitive domain unrelated to intelligence and it has strong association with social 
intelligence. 
 
6.2. Comparison with previous literature 
Previous literature regarding the direct relationship between Theory of Mind and IQ is 
limited and conflicting and this cross sectional study expands the existing knowledge 
base on the path of this exciting quest. Theory of Mind is conceptualized to have social 
perception and social cognition components and Theory of Mind deficits have been 
documented to result significant social impairment. The finding of relationship between 
theory of Mind and social intelligence in this study is in line with prior evidence 
(Tager- Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000). 
Studies have argued for (Muris, et al, 1999) and against (Kelemen, et al., 2004) the 
relationship between Theory of Mind ability and intelligence. They have placed more 
importance either on verbal IQ (Adrian, et al., 2005) or on performance IQ (Buitelaar, 
et al., 1999b). These studies were confounded by psychiatric morbidity, sensory deficits 
and by the effects of psycho tropic medication. By adopting narrow selection criteria, 
this study has established that Theory of Mind has no significant relationship with 
various domains of IQ.  As this study employed a Theory of Mind assessment 
instrument, which demanded less of language ability, there was no significant 
correlation between the language domain and theory of mind ability, which was in 
contrast with prior literature (Ruffman, et al., 2003). 
6.3. Methodological strengths 
The present study, to the best of our knowledge, is the first broad based investigation of 
the direct relationship between Theory of Mind and Intelligence, employing appropriate 
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methodology and definitely the first such endeavour from developing countries. We 
believe that the findings of this study can be transferred to other settings, not only in 
India but also elsewhere.  
We recognize that the current study is competent to answer its principal objectives due 
to the following methodological strengths. First, it was successful in recruiting a sample 
with narrow selection criteria. It carefully excluded the children with neuro psychiatric 
morbidity and other physical illnesses and thus created an opportunity to study the 
Theory of Mind ability in many normally developing children. Second, it studied 
children over broad IQ ranges and included children with above average IQ. This 
helped to obtain inputs about this population, which may have valuable implications in 
planning for their education and medical management. Then, this study calculated an 
adequate sample size a priori and ensured less than 10% drop out during the study 
period. Fourth, the data was collected by two independent masked investigators, which 
reduced the possible biases and augmented the validity of these findings. Fifth, using an 
assessment task such as Picture Sequencing Task which places less demand on general 
language ability and working memory and has inbuilt control for general sequencing 
ability, helped to minimize the effects of these potential confounders. Finally, our data 
analysis included accounting for possible confounders and the findings held their 
significance even during partial correlation and regression analyses. 
6.4. Methodological Limitations 
We acknowledge that this study had to negotiate with many methodological limitations. 
They include, 
1. This study employed convenient sampling, which was prone for inherent biases 
and resulted in a study population, which was not properly matched on many 
socio demographic variables. 
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2. This study was cross sectional and failed to provide the developmental 
perspectives and the period effects between these cognitive modalities. 
3. The academic and research concerns of studying a less confounded sample was 
traded with clinical concerns of recruiting a more pragmatic and consecutive 
sample. Employing stricter selection criteria might have compromised the 
generalizability of these findings. 
4. This study ruled out psychopathology with a screening tool and not with 
structured diagnostic interviews. However, the principal investigator was a 
qualified psychiatrist and all the participants were first assessed by him before 
recruitment. 
5. Assessment of intelligence and adaptive behaviour was done by the same co 
investigator and these variables could have influenced each other. 
 
6.5. Clinical implications 
The findings of this study have prominent clinical, academic and research implications. 
First, this study clarifies the independent existence of Theory of Mind ability and its 
association with social intelligence. This calls for the need to include the evaluation of 
Theory of Mind during all child and adolescent psychiatry assessments. The 
documentation of intelligence quotient by standardized test batteries with out separate 
assessment of Theory of Mind ability may not reflect the real life social competence of 
the child. Children with average or above average IQ may have low theory of mind 
ability and vice versa. Hence, an assessment of Theory of Mind is indispensable to 
understand the child as a whole and to plan for its future care. Second, the functional 
academics and vocational rehabilitation of children with intellectual disability and 
psychiatric morbidity should not exclude a package of training on Theory of Mind 
skills, which will enhance their mentalizing and social skills. Then, possible selective 
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impairment of Theory of Mind abilities not only in pervasive developmental disorders, 
but also in mood or psychotic syndromes, indicate the need to pay more attention to this 
domain during psychotherapy of these disorders. Third, these findings indicate the need 
for the future studies involving Theory of Mind to control their results for various 
domains of intelligence, especially social intelligence and not merely for overall IQ. 
Fourth, the distinct existence of Theory of Mind domain in normal school children has 
serious implications on designing an appropriate curriculum for them. 
 
6.6. Future directives 
Future research on this theme should employ more population based stratified random 
sampling to minimize biases. A longitudinal study is needed to explore the 
developmental changes and to obtain the detailed account of relationship between 
theory of Mind and intelligence. The direct relationship between Theory of Mind and 
adaptive behaviour can be better elicited if different independent investigators assessed 
intelligence and adaptive behaviour. There was a lingering need to validate the Theory 
of Mind assessments tools to obtain reliable results. Generalizability of these findings 
should be checked across cross-cultural settings. Finally, more neuro physiological and 
cognitive neuro psychological research is needed to illuminate the complex biological 
make up of Theory of Mind domain. Then only, the challenge of providing a 
convincing answer for the relationship between theory of Mind and intelligence or 
other general cognitive abilities can be conquered. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
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1. Theory of Mind (ToM) is the cognitive ability to predict and to explain one’s 
own and others’ behaviours in terms of mental states. 
 
2. ToM is vital for successful social functioning, especially for children. 
 
3. Intelligence is considered to be the prime confounding factor in any assessment 
of Theory of Mind. However, the direct relationship between IQ and Theory of 
mind functioning has been less studied systematically. 
 
4.  It is desirable to establish the relationship between Theory of Mind and IQ, in 
children over broad IQ ranges, who never had any neuro-psychiatric morbidity 
unlike the previous studies that have focussed on children with morbidities.  
 
5. Understanding such relationship in children has to be established before the 
concept could be used for future research and clinical practice.  
 
6. In this study, despite the limitations of convenient sampling and of being cross 
sectional, we established that Theory of Mind ability is not directly related to 
intelligence among children. 
 
7.  Theory of Mind ability has been found to have significant association only with 
social intelligence domain. 
8.  These findings support the view that Theory of Mind exists as an independent 
cognitive domain unrelated to intelligence, which has many prominent clinical, 
academic, educational and research implications. 
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9. Further research on ToM among participants without any psychiatric morbidity 
but across different age groups as a cohort study is essential to study ToM 
interaction over time with other cognitive and environmental domains. 
 
10. Currently with the data from this study psychological interventions have to be 
implemented as separate module from those which focus on improving the 
mental as well as the social age. 
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9.1. INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
Title of study:  
  RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEORY OF MIND AND INTELLIGENCE 
 
Institution: 
Christian Medical College & Hospital,  
Vellore. 
                     
Nature and purpose of the study: 
You and your child are taking part in a new research which attempts to study the 
relationship between the general intelligence and the Theory of Mind, an ability to 
predict and to explain behaviors in terms of mental states. 
 
Explanation of procedure to be followed: 
A CMCH doctor and a special educator from the department of child psychiatry will 
conduct this study. Your child will undergo assessment of his / her intelligence and 
Theory of Mind skills with the help of some structured questionnaires.  
 
Expected duration of involvement: 
The assessment will be done in two sessions. Each session will last about one hour.   
 
Possible benefits of the study: 
You will not be charged for this assessment. The information we obtain will help us to 
assess your child’s intellectual ability and theory of Mind skills. Other children may 
also benefit from the overall conclusions at the end of the study. 
 
Confidentiality 
The records and all details obtained in this study will remain strictly confidential at all 
times, but will need to be available to the doctor conducting the study.  Your identity 
will not otherwise be revealed.  Your personal data will be collected and processed only 
for the research purposes in connection with the study.  You will not be referred to by 
name or identified in any report or publication. 
 
Verbal assent from the child 
Verbal assent from the child will be acquired whenever possible. 
 
Right to withdraw from the study 
You are free to leave the study at any time.  Your decision to not to participate in this 
study will not affect our future medical care. 
 
Consent 
I/We have read/………had read out to us, the above information before signing this 
consent form. 
 
Signature of the parent/ guardian         Signature of the person obtaining consent. 
 
Date: 
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9.2. DATA COLLECTION SHEET. 
1. Name of the child              :  
2. Father/ Guardian’s name   : 
3. Sex                                     : male / female 
4. Age (in months)                 : 
5. Area                                   : rural/ semi urban/ urban 
6. Religion                             : Hindu/ Muslim / Christian / Others 
7. Mother tongue                   : 
8. Type of family                   : Nuclear/ Joint/ Broken 
9. Father’s age (in years)       : 
10. Father’s education          : Illiterate/ primary/ middle/ high school/ higher secondary/  
                                                  graduate/ professional. 
11. Father’s occupation           : Unskilled/ semi skilled/ skilled/ professional 
12. Mother’s age (in years)     : 
13. Mother’s education        : Illiterate/ primary/ middle/ high school/ higher secondary/  
                                                   graduate/ professional. 
14. Mother’s occupation         : Unskilled/ semi skilled/ skilled/ professional/ House 
wife. 
15. Number of siblings           : nil/ one/ two/ more than two 
16. Order of birth                    : first/ middle/ last. 
17. Family income per month : Rs. 
18. Consanguinity                   : present/ absent 
19. Family history                   : psychiatric morbidity/ intellectual disability/  
                                                  seizure disorder/ nil 
20. Perinatal insult                  : present/ absent/ unknown. 
21. Developmental delay         :  present/ absent/ unknown. 
22. School                                : Special/ private/ semi private/ government/ nil. 
23. Grade                                  :  
24. Previous exam performance: Topper/ within top ten/ average/ within bottom ten/  
                                                      not applicable. 
25. School Conduct                  : good/ satisfactory/ not satisfactory/ bad. 
26. Current medical problems & medications: 
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PICTURE SEQUENCING TASK: 
 
SERIAL 
NO. 
STORY SEQUENCE TIME(SECs) SCORE 
1 PR 1    
2 PR 2    
3 SS 1    
4 MC 3    
5 FB 3    
6 FB 4    
7 MC 4    
8 SS 3    
9 MC 2    
10 FB1    
11 MC1    
12 SS 2    
13 FB 2    
14 SS 4    
 
PR – Practice; SS- Social script; MC- Mechanical; FB- False belief. 
 
 
 
 98
UNEXPECTED CONTENTS THEORY OF MIND TASK: 
 
SERIAL 
NO. 
QUESTION ANSWER 
1 REALITY 
 
 
2 APPEARANCE 
 
 
3 REPRESENTATIONAL 
CHANGE. 
 
4 FALSE BELIEF. 
 
 
  
SCORE 
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9.3. PICTURE SEQUENCING TASK 
False belief 1
 
False belief 2
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False belief 3
 
 
False belief 4
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Mechanical 1
 
 
Mechanical 2
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9.4.2. STRENGTHS AND DIFFICULTY QUESTIONNAIRE KEY 
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